Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/379

324 appearances only, not the things themselves That is just the point I wish to come to.

"And so the painter can make things in the same way; he does not make the real thing. He makes an apparent table, not a real table.

"But the carpenter—does he make a real table? We have just agreed that he does not make that which is essentially a table, but only a kind of table. He does not make the thing that is, but only something that is like it. If any one says that the thing produced by any handicraftsman really is, he makes a mistake. The things which are thus produced are dim shadows of the truth.

"Now, let us see what is meant by imitation. There are, for instance, three kinds of tables. The first the essential ideal one, which God himself makes; then the one which the carpenter makes; and then the one which the painter makes. The painter, the carpenter, God; these are the three makers of the three kinds of tables. The one made by God is single, unique; there are not and will not be more than one. There cannot be two or more. If He had made two or more ideas of kinds of tables there would be a third—the idea of table in general, and this would be the real idea of table. And thus God is the real author of the real table, but not of any particular table, so as to be a table-maker.

"But the carpenter also makes a table; what is he? He is a table-maker.

"And the painter; does he make a table? No;