Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/351

296 Suppose that a man had no pleasure in eating, but that the food he took merely served to keep him in health and strength, without ministering any further than this to his enjoyment His palate, we suppose, has no sense of taste. His food keeps him alive and in vigour, and that is all. He has no relish, neither has he any repugnance, to any kind of food: all is equally indifferent. Now, in so far as eating is concerned, what would this person's end or object or supreme good be? It would be to keep himself in life, and, moreover, in bodily soundness and activity. That would be his proper end or aim; and what would his duty be? His duty would consist in eating those meats which conduced most effectually to that end, and to eschew the viands which impaired his powers of life and diminished his activity and strength. In abstaining from the latter, and in pursuing the former, he would be walking in the path of duty, because he would be in the way of attaining to his proper end, the preservation of his life and the maintenance and perfecting of his health and strength. This individual, his end, and his duty, illustrate in a lower matter the analogous case in the moral world of which I spoke, and which I called man simply.

30. Let us continue our observation of this individual. Suppose that after a time his food no longer merely keeps him alive and well, but affords a positive and no inconsiderable pleasure to his palate.