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Rh other words, that the good or ultimate end would be different in the case of man simply, from what it would be in the case of man as capable of happiness and of misery. In the former case, it would be the preserving and the perfecting of his rational nature; in the latter case, the end would, to a large extent, be happiness or pleasure—that is, something less intimately connected with himself than the perfection of his intelligent nature. I also stated, that these two ends might frequently coincide, in which case no collision would arise; but they also might come into conflict, and when this happened, I stated that the end called happiness must be sacrificed in favour of the other end, which we may very well call virtue. I also gave you my reason for this conclusion, and it is one which, though then briefly stated, appears to me to be more scientific, logical, or reasonable than any which I have yet fallen in with. Stated again, very shortly and simply, the reason why we should sacrifice our happiness to our virtue is this, that in sacrificing happiness to virtue we do not cease to be men, we only cease to be happy men; but in sacrificing virtue to happiness, we do cease to be men, because virtue is the preservation and perfecting of our rational nature, and therefore whatever is at variance with virtue is at variance with the preservation of our true being, and is pro tanto a curtailment or destruction of our moral and intelligent life.

29. Let me illustrate this subject somewhat further.