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292 Is this the object which he is designed unremittingly to pursue on his own account, and to the utmost of his ability to diffuse on account of others? Or is virtue his chief end? Is the right as distinct from the useful, the just as distinct from the expedient, the object which it is his duty to strive after? Socrates does not seem to have returned any very explicit answer to this question; and hence he has not settled definitely what the good for man is, inasmuch as he has not declared categorically whether it is happiness or virtue. From the spirit of the Socratic teaching we may infer that he regarded virtue as the supreme good; but the scientific grounds on which he rested this conclusion are not apparent. Nor are they apparent in the writings of any subsequent moralists. Many moralists have declared that we must do what is right at all hazards, that we must act rightly irrespective of all considerations of utility. And when we ask why? why must we act rightly? the only answer we get from them is, that we must act aright because it is right to do what is right. This mode of reasoning—and I believe it is a fair representation of the reasoning of Dr Whewell and the other anti-utilitarians—is not very satisfactory. The anti-utilitarian moralists may, however, be regarded as returning an articulate answer to the question, What is summum bonum, the chief end of man? They declare that it is virtue.

26. On the other hand, the utilitarians or