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Rh be his own or that of others; and I give this answer for this reason, that it is of more importance that man should be a man, truly a man, than that he should be a happy man. To be happy, we must first of all be men, and to be men we must first of all be rational. Whatever, therefore, strikes at the root of reason or thought is to be avoided, however much it may promote our happiness, for our reason is our existence. But it does not follow that whatever strikes at the root of our happiness is to be avoided, however much it may promote our rational perfection, for our happiness is not our existence. On these grounds I conceive that when the two ends come into conflict, the preference is to be given to that end which is regarded by man considered as man simply; for this end, its preservation and attainment, is his very essence and existence: and that the preference is not to be given to that end which is set in view before man considered as susceptible of happiness and misery, for in this end his essence and his existence do not centre, happiness and misery being merely accessories to human nature, and not human nature itself.

25. In the latter part of yesterday's lecture I was led into a discussion of a somewhat digressive character. It arose out of the ambiguity in which Socrates had left the conception of the good, meaning by that word the great and proper object of all human pursuit. Is happiness the chief end of man?