Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/344

Rh this; in his actual state, he is in man susceptible of pleasure and pain, of happiness and the reverse. We have now to ask what is the moral scheme applicable to man in this more complicated state. A new element has been introduced into his condition; that, namely, of happiness and misery, and the moral code by which he is to be directed must be accommodated so as to suit and take into account this new element. The modification or addition which the moral code must receive will be understood if we consider the nature of happiness or pleasure, and the nature of misery or pain. The former of these has attractions almost irresistible; the latter has a power of repulsion which naturally drives us back as far as it is possible for us to recoil. Here then we have something which sets itself up as a new summum bonum and as a new summum malum, as a summum bonum and summum malum different from those which attracted and repelled man considered simply as man. Then, the proper end of man's pursuit was the perfection of his rational existence. Now, the proper end of man's pursuit seems to be, indeed I may say is, something different from this; it is happiness, the happiness of himself and others; in a word, his conduct is now tested by its utility, that is, by its tendency to promote or to obstruct the interests and wellbeing of himself and of mankind.

23. It now then appears as if we had two chief ends set up as the proper objects of human pursuit.