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Rh 2. How these schools arose, and how they acquired the title of imperfect Socraticists, may perhaps be understood from the following consideration: The conception of "the good" was a conception which had been largely insisted on in the philosophy of Socrates; but it was, at the same time, one which he had left indefinite and unexplained. Nowhere, and at no time, does he seem to have explained exactly what "the good" was, or what he precisely and consistently meant by that term. That Socrates regarded happiness as the good, is tolerably plain; but then it is equally plain that he regarded virtue as the good. Hence arose ambiguity, and hence arose confusion and discord among his disciples. It is no answer to the question, What is the good? to say the good is both happiness and virtue; for by the good is meant the ultimate, the supreme, or highest good; and two goods cannot, both of them, be the highest, at least their conciliation requires to be explained; in all cases the supreme can be only one. If, indeed, the identity of the two had been established in some such way as I endeavoured to establish it above (p. 265), following out what I conceive to be the drift of the Socratic speculations—if their identity had been established, then perhaps the question as to the supreme good or chief end of man might be admitted to have been sufficiently answered. It might have been said, the good is the identity or conciliation of happiness and virtue; and that answer would have been unambiguous. But this