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Rh which they are characterized. His objection is not without force, and it shows that the Socratic doctrine is not altogether complete. So far as it goes, however—and I think it goes a long way in rendering virtue intelligible—it seems to me to be a sound and rational speculation.

37. The third point is, that no man is voluntarily vicious. This conclusion follows as an immediate corollary from what was said in the preceding paragraph. No man wills to do that which is adverse to his true interests. But a man may mistake his false for his true interests; hence he may enter on a course of action which is at variance with his true interests, and thus he may fall into vice. But he cannot be said to will this vice; for all the while he is willing to promote his own true interests, only, through ignorance as to what these are, he has fallen on a course of conduct which secures only his false interests and promotes only his false happiness; and this is the way of vice, and not the way of virtue. Hence it is only through ignorance of his own true interests that a man is vicious, and not because he wills to be so, for a man wills only his true interests; and if he always knew what these were, he would continue in the practice of virtue, for virtue alone can secure them.

38. The fourth point for consideration is, what, according to Socrates, is the supreme good, the chief