Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/305

250, and from the very first, a sense of our own weal or woe. I conceive that we become sympathetic only after the idea of self has been called forth, and this is an idea which does not show itself in our very early years. But until it does declare itself, our sympathy has no existence. In proof of this you have only to observe how little sympathy very young children have in the sufferings or enjoyments of each other. In them the idea of self is either not developed at all, or it is but feebly developed; the mere feeling of self is predominant or all-absorbing, and hence they are wrapped up in their own sensational and emotional world, and take little or no interest in the happiness or misery of their companions. But gradually as this idea unfolds itself, the emotion of sympathy begins to dawn. In the light of this conception they see that others are just themselves over again; and, taking an interest in themselves, they come to take an interest also in all those whom the idea reveals to them as fashioned after the same model with themselves. The idea of self is no exclusive or egotistic principle; the feeling of self is egotistic and exclusive; but the idea of self is universal and comprehensive. It is the true equaliser of the human race. It is the principle which enables us to understand and, so far as the mere individual feeling will permit, to act according to the Divine precept of doing to others as we would that they should do unto us. Thus self-consciousness, as was formerly explained to you, is essential to the existence of