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Rh generalisation, as our common books on logic teach, still we must be on our guard against accepting this logical explanation of conceptions as a true theory of what thought is in its absolute nature. The other doctrine, which holds that thought does not construct universals out of singulars, conceptions out of particulars, but begins absolutely and at once with universals or general conceptions, this, I conceive, is by far the truer doctrine of the two; although, on account of its profundity, it is more difficult to drag it into light, and present it in an intelligible form. This may be said to be the ancient or Platonic doctrine in regard to the nature of thought; the other doctrine is more modern.

18. In the present Lectures I am engaged, as you are aware, in expounding the drift of the Socratic speculations; and consequently I must, of course, be of opinion that the explanation I have given you as to the nature of thought is virtually one of the Socratic doctrines. Here, however, you may ask what ground I have for this opinion. What warrant have I for attributing to Socrates the doctrine in regard to thought which I have laid before you? I answer that I have no very direct warrant for this, but that I find in the Platonic doctrine of ideas sufficient data to bear me out. The Platonic doctrine of ideas has its origin, I conceive, in the opinion that thought is of the nature which I have endeavoured to