Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/288

Rh Sophists, man is by nature a mere sensational creature. 2d, Out of such a psychology arises a code of natural ethics which is at variance with the conventional ethics of society; hence arose perplexity of mind, if not licentiousness in conduct, and practical embroilment in the affairs of life. 3d, Socrates maintained, in opposition to the Sophists, and as the groundwork of his argument against them, that man is not a mere sensational creature by nature, that he is more than this, that by nature he has thought as well as sensation. 4th, This may be redargued on the part of the Sophists by the assertion that thought (if it be not ultimately resolvable into sensation, which they generally held it to be; but if it be not that,) is at any rate not original, but acquired; is not due to nature, but is due to our contact with society. 5th, This, then, is the question to be discussed, Is thought original or is it derivative, is it a primary or is it a secondary formation? 6th, To settle this question we must first settle what thought is in itself, and what it is as distinguished from sensation. 7th, We have settled that thought differs from sensation in this, that sensation is always occupied with the particular only, while thought, on the contrary, is always occupied with "something more" than the particular, is always occupied with the universal. 8th, Now, then, we have settled the question as to what thought is in itself. Thought is, in its very essence, the apprehension, not of the particular or singular, but of something more than this. 9th, What this "