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194 truth, or of that which, strictly speaking, is not truth at all.

14. It was, however, in the latter sense that the Sophists gave out that man was the measure of the universe. They did not draw the distinction, but we may say that virtually they acknowledged no universal faculty in man. They regarded his particular or sensational nature as his essential constitution, and this sensational nature they set up as the measure of all things. In short, their dogma, viewed theoretically, led to this conclusion,—whatever appears to any individual to be true, that for him is true; and viewed practically, it led to this conclusion,—whatever appears to any individual to be advantageous, that for him is right.

15. Socrates, as you are aware, stood forward as the opponent of the Sophists. And he did so on the ground which I have indicated. The Sophists had set up man as supreme. They had represented truth and virtue as contingent on his constitution. But then they had regarded his constitution as precarious, variable, and particular. Here was where the error lay. Socrates accepted their position; he conceded that truth and virtue depended on the constitution of man; not, however, on the variable and particular part of his nature, but on the invariable and universal part of his nature, on that faculty which he has in common with all intelligence. And, arguing in