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184 his own mind, was the universal in all the objects that came before him, the rallying point in which they were reduced to unity. That reflection generalised would have yielded him his doctrine of  or intelligence as the principle and foundation of all things; and, secondly, we might ask whether Anaxagoras has not reached a truer universal, a principle which is more a truth for all intellect, than any philosopher who preceded him. You will observe that with all these philosophers it was the thought of something, and not pure thought itself, which was the principle. Thus, with the Pythagoreans, it was the thought of number, that is, it was number rather than thought, which was the principle; with the Eleatics, it was the thought of Being, that is, it was Being rather than the thought of Being, which was the principle.

19. So in regard to Heraclitus, and the other philosophers whom we have considered. It was always the thought of something, rather than thought itself which was laid down as the principle. But Anaxagoras laid down thought itself—not the thought of this or of that, but thought itself—as the universal in all things, and this universal being intellect itself, must necessarily be more a truth for all intellect than any that we have yet come across.

20. Significant and suggestive as the philosophy of Anaxagoras is, Socrates complains that it fell short of its promise,—'Phædo,' p. 98.