Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/206

Rh change was impossible, if Being was laid down as invested with one uniform or homogeneous quality; out of such uniformity no diversity could proceed. He therefore supposed that Being was distinguished from itself by original differences of quality; in other words, he supposed several kinds of Being, and then postulating two principles, one of affinity and the other of repulsion,  and  he conceived that by the union and the repulsion of these different kinds of matter, all the phenomena and ongoings of the universe might be explained. He thus conceived that, while he embraced the Eleatic principle of Being as the ground of all things, he at the same time avoided their conclusions, by which the universe was locked up in a state of dead, immovable stagnation.

7. This modification of the Eleatic principle seems sufficiently obvious, and the explanation which it affords of the phenomena of change seems sufficiently plausible. But neither the modification of the principle, nor the explanation arising out of it, is logically tenable. The supposition is, that there are different kinds of Being, that is, of matter to begin with. Being is originally distinguished by certain qualitative differences. But here the question arises, Do these different kinds of Being consist of mere Being? Is matter with its qualitative diversities still mere Being throughout? If it be so, then we have only one element, and from this nothing can emerge but absolute, unvarying uniformity. If, on the other