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134 are held asunder as separate conceptions. And neither is A's not-being or disappearance B's being or appearance. Therefore, I say, there is an interval between A the former state of the thing, and B the subsequent state of the thing, an interval in which A is ended and B not begun. In what state is the thing during that interval? The answer is, that it is in no state at all. And this is the ridiculous and contradictory conclusion to which we are driven, if we suppose change to take place by leaps, and that Being and not-Being, instead of being mere elements of one indivisible conception, are themselves distinct and completed conceptions.

26. By way of illustration, take the following example: Let us suppose that water is undergoing the process of freezing, and that it has reached a certain degree of solidity. Call this state of solidity A; and let us say that this state does not disappear in appearing, but that it lasts for some definite period, say a minute. But if A's appearance lasts for a definite time, A's disappearance must also last for a definite time. Because if we suppose that A's disappearance instantly ceases, and is the appearance of a new degree or state of solidity—call it B—we are violating the very terms of our supposition. Our supposition is, that appearance or being, and disappearance or not-being, are separate conceptions, and therefore we must not suppose that the disappearance of A is the appearance of B. We must suppose