Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/159

104 root of the matter that we can understand either the motive or the character of the Eleatic speculations. To express their principle, then, almost in one word, it is this: that opposite determinations cannot be combined in the same object, that contrary predicates cannot be assigned to the same thing. They hold, for example, that what was one could not be not-one, i.e., many; and that what was many or not-one could not be one. They held that what was universal could not be non-universal, i.e., particular; and that what was particular or non-universal could not be universal. They held that what was intelligible could not be non-intelligible, i.e., sensible; and that what was non-intelligible or sensible could not be intelligible. The same rule was applied to their own ultimate generalisation of Being and not-Being. What was Being could not be not-Being, and what was not-Being could not be Being. What was could not not be, and what was not could not be. To Being, the one, the universal, the intelligible—the predicate not-Being could not be applied; and to not-Being, the particular, the sensible, the many—the predicate of Being could not be applied. In short, the incompatibility of opposite predicates or determinations attaching to the same subject, this is the ultimate foundation, the fundamental position, of the Eleatic philosophy.

29. Now, the question here arises, a question, however, which I shall merely broach without