Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 3 "Philosophical Remains" (1883 ed.).djvu/563

Rh between truth unconditioned and truth conditioned thus resolves itself into the distinction between truth in relation to intelligence simply (), and truth in relation to our intelligence. And the point of the controversy now comes before us in this shape:—Can man apprehend the truth as it exists in relation to pure intelligence—to intelligence considered simply as such? or can he apprehend the truth only as it exists in relation to his intelligence, considered as a peculiar kind or mode of intellect? Now, although it is not clear that Schelling and his opponents have ever joined issue explicitly on this question, it is undoubtedly the question properly in dispute between them. Schelling argues in favour of the former alternative. He holds that philosophy is the pursuit of truth as it stands related to pure intellect, i.e., to intellect considered universally, and as not modified in any particular way: he holds that man is competent to the attainment of such truth, and that such truth is absolute and unconditioned. The other party (among whom we venture to place Hamilton) maintains that philosophy is the pursuit of truth as it stands related to our minds considered as a particular kind or form of intelligence—that man can attain to no other truth than this, and that this truth is relative and conditioned.

These respective conclusions rest on wounds which have now to be considered as forming the ultimate stage in the adjustment of this controversy. Schelling's ground is that there is a common nature or