Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 3 "Philosophical Remains" (1883 ed.).djvu/532

522 imagination alone, and no contrast between the objects of these two faculties being upon such a supposition possible, our conclusion was that the objects in both cases would be believed by those two minds to stand on a footing of equality in regard to their real existence. Now, let us suppose that these two faculties, perception and imagination, are possessed by one and the same mind, and that the law of contrast is absent or inoperative, that no comparison takes place, and I maintain that the result will be precisely the same as it was in the case of the two separate minds. The objects of imagination will stand on the same footing with the objects of perception in regard to our belief in their existence. When we actually see an object, and do not contrast this object even in the remotest manner with some imaginary object, we cannot, strictly speaking, be said either to believe or disbelieve in its existence; but we certainly do virtually, though perhaps not very consciously, believe, and vitally believe, in its existence. In the same way, when we are plunged in a reverie, and a succession of objects, i.e., visionary pictures, arises before our imagination, which we do not contrast even by the remotest implication with any of the objects of sense, we cannot, strictly speaking, be said either to believe or disbelieve in their existence; but I agree with Mr Stewart in holding that we do virtually, though not very consciously, believe in their existence, and they are really present to our minds. For if the law of contrast between perception