Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 3 "Philosophical Remains" (1883 ed.).djvu/527

Rh that the objects of the imagination are accompanied with no belief in their reality; for we believe these objects to be unreal, we pronounce them to be unreal by means of the comparison which we draw between them and the more permanent and real objects of perception. In this case, that is to say, when the law of contrast is supposed to be present, or when comparison between perceived objects and imagined objects is drawn, Dr Reid is quite right in holding that imagination is attended with no belief in the existence of its object. But this law of contrast is not always present; far from it, it is sometimes, it is frequently, perhaps it is in most cases, absent when the imagination is at work; in which case I hold that its objects, not being contrasted or in any way compared with those of perception, are accompanied at any rate with no disbelief in their existence. And being accompanied with no disbelief in their existence, I think we may go a step further, and say with Mr Stewart that these objects, the objects of the imagination, are accompanied with a belief, momentary though it be, of their existence. It appears to me that though the belief may not be of an express or positive character, still there is a tacit and virtual belief in the real existence of these imaginary objects when the law which I have called that of contrast between perception and imagination is not in force.

3. To illustrate more fully the effect which the