Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 3 "Philosophical Remains" (1883 ed.).djvu/447

Rh means, he is still just where he was; he must again ask how or by what means these discovered means explode the gunpowder; and so on ad infinitum. Now the mind may quibble with itself for ever, and make what difficulties it pleases in this way; but there is no real difficulty in the case. In considering any sequence, we always know the how or the means as soon as we know the that or the fact. These means may be more proximate or more remote means, but they are invariably given either proximately or remotely along with and in the fact. As soon as we know that fire explodes gunpowder, we know how fire explodes gunpowder; for fire is itself the means which explodes gunpowder, the how by which it is ignited. In the same way, if we knew that matter gave rise to perception, there would be no difficulty as to how it did so. Matter would be itself the means which gave rise to perception. We conceive, therefore, that Mr Stewart did not consider what he was saying when he affirmed that Reid's plain statement of facts exhibited the difficulty in all its magnitude. If Reid's statement be a statement of fact, all difficulty vanishes, the question of perception is relieved from every species of perplexity. If it be the fact that perception is consequent on the presence of matter, Reid must be admitted to have explained, to the satisfaction of all mankind, how perception is brought about. Matter is itself the means by which it is brought about.

Secondly, then, Is it the fact that matter gives