Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 3 "Philosophical Remains" (1883 ed.).djvu/409

Rh (our tangible bodies, namely) is the sense of touch brought within its own sphere. It comes before itself as one sensation of hardness. Consequently all its other sensations of hardness are necessarily excluded from this particular hardness; and falling beyond it, they are, by the same consequence, built up into a world of objective reality, of permanent substance, altogether independent of the sense, self-betrayed as a sensation of hardness.

But here, it may be asked, if the senses are thus reduced to the rank of sensations, if they come under our observation as themselves sensations, must we not regard them but as parts of the subjective sphere; and though the other portions of the sphere may be extrinsic to these sensations, still, must not the contents of the sphere, taken as a whole, be considered as entirely subjective, i.e., as merely ours, and consequently must not real objective existence be still as far beyond our grasp as ever? We answer, No; by no means. Such a query implies a total oversight of all that experience proves to be the fact with regard to this matter. It implies that the senses have not been reduced to the rank of sensations, that they have not been brought under our cognisance as themselves sensations, and that they have yet to be brought there. It implies that vision has not been revealed to us as a sensation of colour in the phenomenon, the eye; and that touch has not been revealed to us as a sensation of hardness in the phenomenon, the finger. It implies, in short, that it is