Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 3 "Philosophical Remains" (1883 ed.).djvu/400

390 but dogmatical. We merely say, that if this can be shown to be the case, then the demonstration which we are in the course of unfolding will hardly fail to recommend itself to his acceptance. Whether or not it is the case can only be established by an appeal to our experience.

We ask, then, Does experience inform us, or does she not, that the sphere of sense falls within, and very considerably within, itself? But here it will be asked, What meaning do we attach to the expression, that sense falls within its own sphere? These words, then, we must first of all explain. Everything which is apprehended as a sensation—such as colour, figure, hardness, and so forth—falls within the sentient sphere. To be a sensation, and to fall within the sphere of sense, are identical and convertible terms. When, therefore, it is asked, Does the sphere of sense ever fall within itself? this is equivalent to asking, Do the senses themselves ever become sensations? Is that which apprehends sensations ever itself apprehended as a sensation? Can the senses be seized on within the limits of the very circle which they prescribe? If they cannot, then it must be admitted that the sphere of sense never falls within itself, and consequently that an objective reality—i.e., a reality extrinsic to that sphere—can never be predicated or secured for any part of its contents. But we conceive that only one rational answer can be returned to this question. Does not experience teach us, that much if not the whole of