Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 3 "Philosophical Remains" (1883 ed.).djvu/36

26 thing to be in a particular state, and to be aware that it is in this state, is surely not one and the same fact, but two totally distinct and separate facts. In proof of which witness the case of matter; or perhaps matter also does something more than change; perhaps matter too has a 'me,' which is identical with it, and cognisant of its changes. Has it so? Do you identify your 'me' with matter likewise, and do you make matter take notice of its own changes? And do you thus still preserve entire the analogy between mind and matter?"

"No."

"Then the parallel is at an end. So far as the mere fact of change in either case is concerned, this parallel remains perfect, and if you confine your attention to this fact, it is not to be denied that analogous sciences of the two objects may be established upon exactly the same principles. But when you depart from this fact, as you have been forced to do by a criticism which goes no deeper than the mere surface of the language you make use of; and when you take your stand upon another fact which is to be found in the one object, while the opposite of it is to be found in the other object; the analogy between them becomes, in that point, completely violated. And this violation carries along with it, as shall be shown, the total subversion of any similarity between the two methods of inquiry which might have resulted from it, supposing it to have been preserved unbroken. You have been brought, by the very