Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 3 "Philosophical Remains" (1883 ed.).djvu/263

Rh "that is a table." But if it be asked, what does "I" mean? and if the same person were to point to himself and say, "this is 'I'," this would convey quite a wrong meaning unless the inquirer, before putting the question, had originated within himself the notion "I," for it would lead him to suppose, and to call that other person "I." This is a strange paradox, but a true one; that a person would be considered mad, unless he applied to himself a particular name, which if any other person were to apply to him, he would be considered mad.

Neither are we to suppose that this word "I" is a generic word, equally applicable to us all, like the word "man"; for, if it were, then we should all be able to call each other "I," just as we can all call each other with propriety "man."

Further, the consideration of this question, by conducting us to inquiries of a higher interest, and of a real significance, enables us to get rid of most or all of the absurd and unsatisfactory speculations connected with that unreal substance which nobody knows anything about, called "mind." If mind exists at all, it exists as much when man is born as it ever does afterwards; therefore, in the development of mind, no new form of humanity is evolved. But no man is born "I "; yet, after a time, every man becomes "I." Here, then, is a new form of humanity displayed; and, therefore, the great question is, What is the genesis of this new form of man? What are the facts of its origin? How does it come