Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/92

64 being taken at their own word. They are very fond of playing fast and loose with their own statements.

§ 72. Perhaps it may be thought that the confusion or inconsistency here pointed out admits of extrication. It admits of none—at least of none which is at all satisfactory. The philosopher may say that, by the "absolutely inconceivable," he means merely the inconceivable by us. If so, then his statement just amounts to this, that we may rationally suppose many things to exist which are simply inconceivable by us, but still conceivable by other intelligences, actual or possible—a proposition which may be very readily admitted. But in making that statement, why should he confound thought and language by breaking down, or at any rate by not keeping up, so palpable and important a distinction as that which subsists between the merely inconceivable by us, and the absolutely inconceivable in itself? The former falls properly under the category of the conceivable; because if a thing is conceivable at all, if we can conceive it as conceivable by any possible intelligence, that consideration is sufficient to place it in this category: the latter constitutes the category of the properly inconceivable, and is, as has been said, convertible with the contradictory.

§ 73. Again, when the absurdity of saying that