Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/89

Rh to be distinguished from it, stands the category of the absolutely, and, in itself, inconceivable—this throughout its whole extent is convertible with the contradictory, the absurd.

§ 69. To retort this charge of inconsistency, it may here be remarked, that the ordinary philosophical distinction of the conceivable and the inconceivable is a distinction which sets every rule of logical division at defiance, and that it is one which, for long, has overridden speculation with a most calamitous oppression. The distinction is this: Things (using that word in a very general sense) are divided by philosophers into things conceivable by us on the one hand (these are placed under a distinct head or category by themselves, as the only properly conceivable), and, on the other hand, into things, still conceivable, though not conceivable by us—and these are laid down under a separate head as the properly inconceivable, the inconceivable without any qualification. Now, observe what follows from this: the inconceivable, as here laid down, is thus slumped together in the same general category with the absolutely inconceivable; the inconceivable by us, is placed in the same category with the inconceivable in itself—that is, with the contradictory and nonsensical. Surely the inconceivable by us, but still conceivable by others, has a much closer affinity to the conceivable by us than it