Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/608

580 apprehension, while the word "apprehending" signifies only inchoate or inceptive apprehension in other words, apprehension which is not apprehension until supplemented by the apprehension of myself as well as of the thing. A closed or completed cognition is alone a cognition, and yet a half or uncompleted cognition is, in a manner, cognition. This explanation may be sufficient to obviate the first part of Mr Hansel's objection. The process of cognition (according to my system) may be shortly stated in this formula. I apprehend (intelligently, and as an intelligible or completed object) me—apprehending (sensibly, unintelligently, and as an unintelligible or nonsensical, or uncompleted object) matter per se. The two together, subject and object, alone constitute the completed and presentable datum which is before me. The ambiguity in the twofold use of the word apprehend is, perhaps, not sufficiently explained in the Institutes. But the doctrine which involves this twofold use is fully unfolded under Proposition X. of the Epistemology.

Secondly, The other part of Mr Mansel's objection (if I understand it aright) centres in the consideration of the infinite series of self-duplications which the mind or ego must undergo (on the terms of my system), before it can realise a single act, or compass a single object of knowledge. I confess that I am totally unable to see the necessity of this; and until the objection be presented in a clearer and more