Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/606

578 an intelligence is conceived of along with Immensity and Eternity, these become conceivable in themselves, though perhaps not conceivable by us; when no intelligence is conceived of along with them, they are absolutely inconceivable in themselves, mere absurdity and contradiction. In regard to causation, the true theory of will or cause is indicated, though not fully worked out, in the Institutes, Prop. IX., obs. 13.

To Mr Mansel of Oxford I am indebted for some observations on the Institutes, published in a note appended to a lecture delivered by him some months ago, in the university of which he is so distinguished an ornament. His objections are written in a fair spirit, and accompanied by compliments more flattering than my philosophy deserves. The most formidable difficulty or objection which Mr Mansel advances is contained in the following extract: "According to Professor Ferrier, the apprehension of matter per se is a contradiction. I can only apprehend myself-as-apprehending-matter. But this second self is, ex hypothesi, equally incapable of apprehending matter per se. It can only apprehend it under the same condition as the first, namely, by apprehending itself along with it. I cannot, therefore, apprehend myself as apprehending matter; but I must apprehend myself as apprehending myself-as-apprehending-matter. But the third self, again,