Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/588

560 these items strictly by themselves, and out of all relation to each other, but these items combined, in some way or other, together? Or, to express this shortly, it may be asked, is real existence a simple, or is it a compound? Is it existence, or is it not rather coexistence? Now, the answer to this question would declare what, in the opinion of the respondent, real existence is. Say that it is a simple, and not a compound; that answer, right or wrong, declares what it is. Say that it is a compound, and not a simple, that answer, too, right or wrong, affirms what it is. My answer in the Institutes, after much elaborate demonstration, and in opposition to the whole teaching of psychology, is that it is a compound, and not a simple; expressed technically, real existence, according to my system, is always a synthesis of subject and object, a union of mind and something else which is not so strictly mind as mind itself is mind; and I have ventured to predicate this conclusion, even in regard to the Divine mind; for it is impossible to conceive this without certain attributes or certain works, and these, God's attributes of power, wisdom, and goodness—these, and also his works, are certainly not so strictly Himself, as He himself is Himself. So that here, too, the truth holds good that intelligence (the ego, the person) and something else, whatever it may be, is that which constitutes true, and real, and concrete existence.