Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/525

RhPROP. IX.———— considered, it will be necessary to introduce a short account of the doctrine of "innate ideas," viewed both in itself and in its history. This theory has been generally, if not universally, misunderstood; and, as has usually happened in philosophical controversies, its supporters and its impugners have been both equally at fault. Before commenting on the false, it will be proper to give the true, version of this celebrated opinion—and before showing in what sense it is wrong and untenable, to show in what sense it is tenable and right.

21. Rightly understood, the doctrine of innate ideas is merely another form of expression for the initial principle (Prop. 1.) of these Institutes. From an accurate observation of the fact in regard to knowledge, we learn that every cognition, or perception, or idea, consists, and must consist, of two heterogeneous parts, elements, or factors,—one of which is contributed from within—belongs to the mind itself and hence is said to be innate; the other of which is contributed from without, and hence may be said to be extranate (if such a word may be used), or of foreign extraction. To render this somewhat abstract statement perfectly intelligible and convincing, all that we have to do is to translate it into the concrete; and to affirm, that whenever a man apprehends an external thing (this is the foreign, the extranate ingredient in the total