Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/517

RhPROP. IX.———— which asserted that our cognitions were caused or produced by material things operating upon our minds. They are commendable, as evidences of a reaction or struggle against that contradictory position. But they did not go to the root of the mischief: they involved no critical inquiry into the essential structure of all cognition; and hence they failed to reduce matter per se to the condition of a contradiction.

13. Locke's explanation of the origin of our knowledge differs from the opinions of his predecessors only by being more ambiguous and perfunctory. Material things exist, and give rise to our sensible ideas or perceptions, because they are fitted to do so by the Divine law and appointment. That sentence contains the substance of all that has been advanced by Locke on the subject now under consideration, and the doctrine which it expresses is obviously a mere jumble of the four hypotheses which have just been commented on. Like his predecessors, Locke was a staunch representationist. The philosopher next to be named was the first who distinctly promulgated a doctrine of intuitive perception, although he seldom gets credit for having done so.

14. Berkeley's merits and defects have been already touched upon (see Epistemology, Prop.