Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/472

444PROP. VIII.———— be known. If either of these points could be established, the counter-proposition would stand firm, and Proposition VIII. would be overthrown. But it is conceived that both of these positions have been thoroughly subverted in the course of these discussions, and directly opposite conclusions demonstratively reached; and therefore this Counter-proposition must just submit quietly to go the way of all its brethren.

12. The following illustration will throw additional light on the difference between the doctrine here advocated in regard to the object of our ignorance and the opinion maintained by ordinary thinking. In our ordinary moods we conceive that objects without any subject are, to a large extent the objects of our ignorance; and we hold this opinion, because, in our ordinary moods, we suppose that objects without any subject are, to some extent the objects of our knowledge. But in our ordinary moods we never fall into the absurdity of supposing that jects without any ob are the objects of our ignorance. If a man were told that jects without ob were what he was ignorant of, he would have some reason to complain that he was being made a fool of. He always conceives himself to be ignorant of what is expressed by the whole word "object" and not of what is expressed by any one of its syllables. In the same way these Institutes would be stultified if they were to admit that