Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/452

424PROP. V.———— in other words, that it can know them only as seen things, as touched things, and so forth—some subjective contribution being always added to the thing, and the total object apprehended being thus a composite product made up of a part which was objective, and a part which was subjective. Hence they concluded, very rashly and inconsiderately, that we were ignorant of the objective part per se, or separated from the subjective part. They adopted this counter-proposition. They gave out that we were ignorant of matter per se, of things by and in themselves. This conclusion is more particularly embraced and insisted upon by Kant.

8. This conclusion, however, rests on an assumption which contradicts the most strongest and essential principles of reason. It is founded on the assumption that these things may possibly be known as they are, by and in themselves, and out of relation to all intelligence. This premiss must be postulated by those who maintain that we are ignorant of material things per se; because it would be manifestly absurd to assert that we could be ignorant of what could not possibly be known. This, then, is their postulation; and if it were true, or if it could be conceded, their conclusion would be perfectly legitimate.

9. But the whole tenor of this work has proved