Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/383

RhPROP. XVII.———— universal, or "me," which is the proper object of intellect, is absurd and incognisable by itself, the following explanations must be given: Intellect is not, like sense, a faculty of nonsense, for this reason, that it is competent to take cognisance of the synthesis of oneself and things (or thoughts): it apprehends both elements together, and this union is manifestly comprehensible,—although either element, without the other, is just as manifestly incomprehensible. In so far as its own mere element (the "me" dissociated from all thoughts and things) is concerned, intellect must be pronounced a faculty of the contradictory, just as the senses are of this character. Nothing short of the completed synthesis is presentable, or comprehensible by the mind,—and what more would people have?

23. To return to the consideration of substance. What, according to the expositors of the ancient opinion; was the Platonic doctrine in regard to substance? Misled by the ambiguities which have been noticed and cleared up, these commentators say or insinuate that, according to the ancient speculators, the substantial does not come to the mind through the senses at all—not even in part—but through some channel altogether independent of sense. It is apprehended by pure intellect alone. The senses have no part to play in placing it before the mind. They thus arrogate for their master and