Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/381

RhPROP. XVII.———— in cognition, by reason of its contingent and variable character. This, however, is obviously a mistake; because "I-myself" cannot be known unless along with some particular thing or thought, or determination of one kind or other, any more than the thing or thought can be known unless along with me. So that the term "I-myself" is an expression of the phenomenal, just as much as the term "tree" or "anger" is an expression of the phenomenal. Neither of the factors can be known without the other, consequently each of them is the phenomenal, conformably to the definition of phenomenon; but both of them can be known together without anything else being known; consequently, their synthesis is the substantial in cognition, conformably to the definition of known substance.

21. Notwithstanding these ambiguities, there cannot be a doubt that the doctrine of known substance propounded by the older systems has much in common—is, indeed, in its spirit, identical—with the doctrine set forth in these Institutes. According to the Platonic and pre-Platonic speculations, substance is not that which is apprehended solely by means of the senses; nor is it that which is apprehended solely by means of the intellect. It is apprehended partly by sense and partly by intellect. The sensible, particular, or material element comes through the senses, the intelligible, ideal, or universal element (the