Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/365

RhPROP. XVII.———— , which alone come before us; and among these, and equally phenomenal in its character, falls to be ranked what is called the synthesis in cognition of objects and subject—matter and me—mind with thoughts or things present to it—the universal and the particular—the ego and the non-ego."

2. This counter-proposition is a conglomeration of epistemology and ontology, with a slight tincture of common opinion, and a large menstruum of psychological doctrine. To disentangle its contents, therefore, it must be put through a refining process—first, in order to clear it from all ontological admixture, and to disengage and exhibit that part of it which psychology opposes to the proposition; and, secondly, in order to disengage and exhibit that part of it which ordinary thinking opposes to the proposition.

3. First, Part of this counter-proposition is obviously ontological. Although psychology professes to have no faith in ontology, and disclaims all connection with so unapproachable a department of metaphysics, she nevertheless retains such a hold over this unreclaimed province as enables her, unless vigorously withstood, to disconcert the operations of the exact reason, and to impede the progress of genuine speculation. Thus, when the question is put, What is the substantial in