Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/353

RhPROP. XV.———— with the universal (by Prop. VI.) The ego, or mind, or subject, or oneself; can be known only along with some thing or thought or determinate condition of one kind or another (by Prop. IX.) Therefore all these, conformably to the definition of phenomenon, are the phenomenal in cognition.

1. In this case the counter-proposition is somewhat peculiar. In expression it is coincident with the proposition, but in meaning it is diametrically opposed to it. Psychology holds that we are cognisant only of the phenomenal, because our faculties are inadequate to reach the substantial. Hence it holds that we are cognisant of the things enumerated in the proposition only as phenomena. The proposition, on the other hand, holds that we are cognisant of these things as phenomena, not because we are incompetent to apprehend the substantial (see Props. XVI., XVII.), but because we can be cognisant of each of them only along with something else—that is, can be cognisant of each part only along with its counterpart. So that the error of psychology does not lie in the affirmation that we are cognisant of material, or other, objects only as phenomena, or of ourselves only as a phenomenon (the proposition affirms the same); but it lies in the attribution of this cognisance to a wrong