Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/267

RhPROP. VIII.———— particular part in all cognition. Hence the necessity of Proposition VI., in which that truth is established. These data having been fixed, the conclusion can be logically drawn, as the following short recapitulation will show: First, Every cognition contains a universal part (the same in each), and also a particular part (different in each)—Proposition VI. Second, The ego is the universal part (the same in each); matter, in its various forms, is the particular part (different in each)—Proposition VII. Third, Therefore the ego, being the universal part, cannot be the particular part of cognition; and not being the particular part, it cannot be matter, because matter is the particular part. Therefore the ego or mind cannot be material, or rather cannot be known as such (Prop. VIII.); for it is only as a question of knowing that this subject is at present under consideration. If the word immateriality be understood, as it very well may, in the sense of universality, we may assert, with perfect truth and propriety, and as a known and proved fact, the immateriality of the mind, ego, or thinking principle. Taken with this explanation, the doctrine advocated in these Institutes coincides with the opinion of the spiritualists. But the instant any attempt is made to describe the mind, or oneself, as a particular immaterial substance, distinct from another particular kind of substance called matter, these Institutes part company with the psychology of immaterialism, and disclaim