Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/253

RhPROP. VIII.———— of cognition (Prop. VII.) Therefore, if the ego could be known to be material, it would be known as the changeable, contingent, and particular element of cognition. But the ego is known as the unchangeable, necessary, and universal element of cognition (Prop. VII.) Therefore the ego cannot be known to be material, &c.

Or, again: Matter, in its various forms, is known as the particular element of cognition. If therefore, the ego could be known to be material as well as the bodies which it knows, it would be known as some form of the particular element of cognition; in which case a cognition would be formed, consisting entirely of the particular constituent of knowledge: (for, of course, no variety in the particular element can ever make it other than particular.) But this supposition contradicts Proposition VI., which declares that every cognition must contain a common or universal, as well as a particular and peculiar constituent. Therefore the ego cannot be known to be material.

Or, once more: The universal element of cognition is known as such, precisely because it is known as not the particular element; and conversely the particular element is known as such, precisely because it is known as not the universal element. Hence the ego, which is known as the universal element, and matter, which is known as the particular element, cannot, either of them, be known to