Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/173

RhPROP. V.———— in Counter-proposition IV., that matter per se is known; and at other times it advocates a doctrine for which natural thinking is certainly in no way responsible—the opinion, namely, that we are cognisant only of the material qualities per se. The first of these opinions is set at rest by Proposition IV., which proves that a contradiction is involved in the supposition that material things, by and in themselves, or without a mind being known along with them, can be known by any intelligence. The proposition now before us is introduced chiefly for the purpose of meeting and correcting the second of these opinions, to which a distinct expression is given in the following counter-proposition. It will be at once obvious that this counter-proposition involves a contradiction just as much as Counter-proposition IV. does; because it asserts that certain qualities of matter can be known without the "me" being known along with them. But it has been thought necessary to bring forward this doctrine, and to controvert it expressly, because it is one which is generally considered as placed beyond the reach of controversy by means of a psychological distinction of some celebrity, the value of which shall now be critically tested.

2. Fifth Counter-proposition.—"Although matter per se is not known, certain of its qualities are knowable, and are known per se, or by themselves."