Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/166

138PROP. IV.———— extend to the circle. A mere contradiction of this kind would leave matter per se altogether unaffected. But the cognisance of a centreless circle is not only a contradictory cognisance; the object of it is, moreover, a contradictory object. A centreless circle is absolutely incogitable in itself. The contradiction which attaches to matter per se is of this character. Matter per se is a contradictory thing, just as much as a circle without a centre is a contradictory thing. In the case of the centreless circle, the object is contradictory, because it lacks an element (to wit, the centre) which is essential to the constitution not only of every know; but of every knowable circle; and in like manner, matter per se is contradictory, because it wants the element (to wit, the me) which is essential to the constitution not only of every known, but of every knowable thing, (Prop. II.) It is thus certain that matter per se is a contradictory thing, and that the contradiction (as these remarks have been introduced to show) cleaves not only to the cognition but to its object. A thing which can be known or conceived only when something else is known or conceived along with it, must surely present a contradiction to the mind whenever an attempt is made to know or conceive it by itself.

19. This position being secured—the reduction, namely, of matter per se to a contradiction—the