Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/164

136PROP. IV.———— to no more than this, that things cannot be known unless they are presented in some way or other to an intelligent mind. A few remarks, therefore, must be made to obviate this natural but very serious misunderstanding, and to show that the contradiction in question affects not merely knowledge, but its objects. To speak first of merely contradictory knowledge: Suppose it to be laid down as a necessary truth of reason, that a man can be cognisant of things only when they are present either really or ideally, to his consciousness; that position would merely fix all knowledge as contradictory in which the things to be known were not presented to the mind. It would leave the things themselves unaffected. They would not be contradictory; they would still be possible, though not actual, objects of knowledge. Matter per se (supposing it cognisable) would not be itself contradictory because the cognisance of it, except upon certain conditions, was contradictory. It would be rather hard upon matter per se to visit it with the consequences of our refusal to comply with the conditions of cognition, or to suppose that it was an absurdity, because we happened to be asleep, or occupied with something else. Here, then, the contradiction attaches only to the knowledge of matter per se. That is absurd and impossible, unless the conditions requisite to its attainment are complied with. The thing itself is untouched; it remains unknown, but not unknowable.