Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/160

132PROP. IV.———— that psychology may assent to the position that Y (to continue these symbols) cannot know X without knowing Y, or itself, as well. It is indeed by no means certain that psychology distinctly disavows this principle (so vacillating is her procedure), although it is quite inconsistent with the general scope of her instructions, and with the conclusions at which she arrives. But supposing it to be conceded, psychology may still contend that this position does not prove X per se to be absolutely and universally unknowable. She may argue—indeed does argue—that although X per se (matter by itself) may not be known by us (the human Y), it may, nevertheless, be known by other intelligences, actual or possible; that is, by some Y differently constituted from us. Psychology thus attributes our incompetency to know matter per se to some peculiarity or special limitation in our faculties of cognition. Not to speak of lesser men, even Kant has fallen into this mistake. But a very moderate degree of reflection might have convinced them that we are prevented from knowing matter per se by no such cause. The imperfection or limitation of our faculties can only prevent us from knowing how, or under what modes of apprehension different from ours, matter may be known by other intelligences, supposing such to exist. Matter per se is unknowable by us on a very different account. It is unknowable, not on account of any special disability