Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/159

RhPROP. IV.———— is also deducible from the other position, a few words may be added to show that this is not the case. Suppose we merely affirm, with psychology, that Y must always be along with X in order that X may be apprehended; there would be nothing in that position to prevent X per se from being apprehended—nothing to support the conclusion that all knowledge of X per se is impossible; the only inference (which, however, would be a mere restatement of the position) would be that wherever X was known there must always be a Y present to know it. That is undoubted; but this inference is very far from being equivalent to the conclusion that X per se cannot be known. X per se can be known, if Y can know it without being cognisant of itself at the same time; for to say that X per se is known, simply means that X is known without Y being known along with it. But the conclusion that X per se cannot be known, is irresistible on the other premises; because if Y must not only be along with X in order to know X, but must also be known along with X in order to know X, it is obviously impossible that X per se can be known, or that Y can know X without knowing Y—i.e., itself—at the same time.

15. Another point of essential difference between the views maintained in this system and the ordinary psychological opinions is this: It is possible