Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/157

RhPROP. IV.———— psychology. Let X represent the material universe, and let Y represent self or the subject: the law is that Y can apprehend X only provided, and when, it apprehends Y as well. (It shall be proved farther on that Y can conceive or think of X only provided, and when, it conceives Y as well; meanwhile this is assumed.) So that what Y apprehends, or thinks of, is never X per se, but always is, and must be, X plus Y. The synthesis of X and Y—that is, the only universe which the laws of knowledge permit Y (i.e. any intelligence) to know or conceive—this is the thesis maintained in these Institutes.

12. Let this position be now contrasted with the ordinary and psychological opinion. Let X, as before, represent the material universe, and let Y represent self or the subject; the law is that Y can apprehend X only provided, and when, it is present to X. Here nothing is said about the necessity of Y apprehending Y, or itself, whenever it apprehends X; but all that is held to be necessary is that Y should be present to X whenever it apprehends X. But this position is entirely different from that set forth in the preceding paragraph, and it leads to a directly opposite conclusion; because if all that is required to enable Y to apprehend X be that Y should be present to X, there is nothing to prevent Y from being cognisant of X per se: