Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/135

RhPROP. III.———— shared in by psychology—namely, that subject and object are two units, and not merely one unit or minimum of cognition—is combated and exploded in our second proposition in terms sufficiently express. On these accounts it has appeared advisable to give to Proposition III. a distinct and leading place in the system.

2. Two things are properly said to be separable from each other in cognition, when they can be separated in such a way that the one of them can be known or apprehended without the other. Thus a tree and a stone are separable from each other in cognition, because a tree can be apprehended without a stone being apprehended, and conversely. But when two things cannot be separated in such a way that the one of them can be apprehended without the other, but only in such a way that the one is never confounded with the other—these two things cannot with any propriety be said to be separable, but only to be distinguishable in cognition. This is the predicament in which subject and object, self and surrounding things, are placed. The two can at all times be intelligently distinguished from each other. They cannot at any time be intelligently separated from each other. They are clearly distinguishable; they are absolutely inseparable in cognition.

3. Both this and the second proposition affirm