Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/127

RhPROP. II.———— that may be at any particular time. It is quite possible for the mind to attend more to one part of any given presentation than to another. The mind does indeed usually attend most to that part of every presentation which is commonly called the thing. But the part so attended to is not the whole object; it is not properly the object of our knowledge. It is only part of the object, the object being that part together with the other part of the presentation (self; namely, or the subject) which is usually less attended to, but which is necessary to complete every datum of cognition. In other words, the object, usually so called, is only part of the object of the mind, although it may be that part which is most attended to. The object, properly so called, is always the object with the addition of the subject, because this alone is the whole object of our apprehension. That which is usually termed the object may be sometimes conveniently termed the objective part of the object of knowledge, and that which is usually called the subject may be sometimes conveniently called the subjective part of the object of knowledge. But the ordinary distinction of subject and object in which they are contrasted as the knowing and the known, and in which the subject is virtually denied to be any part of the object of our knowledge, is erroneous and contradictory, and has had a most mischievous effect on the growth and fortunes of philosophy.