Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/696

 these several descriptions of cases: 1st, To all those which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of Legislation; 2d, To all those which concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the Articles of Union; 3d, To all those in which the United States are a party; 4th, To all those which involve the of the, whether they relate to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, or to that between the States themselves; 5th, To all those which originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; and, lastly, to all those in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased.

The first point depends upon this obvious consideration, that there ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions. What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of the State Legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of them? The States, by the plan of the Convention, are prohibited from doing a variety of things; some of which are incompatible with the interests of the Union, and others with the principles of good Government. The imposition of duties on imported articles, and the emission of paper money, are specimens of each kind. No man of sense will believe, that such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded, without some effectual power in the Government to restrain or correct the infractions of them. This power must either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an authority in the Fœderal Courts to overrule such as might be in manifest contravention of the Articles of Union. There is no third course that I can imagine. The latter appears to have been thought by the Convention preferable to the former, and, I presume, will be most agreeable to the States.