Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/688

 pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the Legislature. This might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. The Courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise instead of, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the Legislative body. The observation, if it proved anything, would prove that there ought to be no Judges distinct from that body.

If then the Courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution, against Legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of Judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the Judges, which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.

This independence of the Judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals, from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the People themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the mean time, to occasion dangerous innovations in the Government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. Though I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur with its enemies, in questioning that fundamental principle of republican Government, which admits the right of the People to alter or abolish the established Constitution, whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness, yet it is not to be inferred from this principle, that the Representatives of the People, whenever a