Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/629

 at the same time consider, how much more easy it must be to influence the small number of which a Council of Appointment consists, than the considerable number of which the National Senate would consist, we cannot hesitate to pronounce, that the power of the Chief Magistrate of this State, in the disposition of offices, must, in practice, be greatly superior to that of the Chief Magistrate of the Union.

Hence it appears, that except as to the concurrent authority of the President in the Article of treaties, it would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than the Governor of New York. And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretence for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the King of Great Britain. But to render the contrast, in this respect, still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group.

The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the People for four years: the King of Great Britain is a perpetual and hereditary Prince. The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace: the person of the other is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a qualified negative upon the Acts of the Legislative body: the other has an absolute negative. The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces of the Nation: the other, in addition to this right, possesses that of declaring war, and of raising and regulating fleets and armies by his own authority. The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the Legislature in the formation of treaties: the other is the sole possessor of the power of making treaties. The one would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices: the other is the sole author of all appointments. The one can confer no